Publications

Nature Climate Change, 2019

Working papers

For any emission trading system (ETS) with quantity-based endogenous supply of allowances, there exists a negative demand shock, e.g. induced by abatement policy, that increases aggregate supply and thus cumulative emissions. We prove this green paradox for a general model and then apply it to the details of EU ETS. In 2018, new rules for a Market Stability Reserve (MSR) were agreed on and implemented. We show that abatement policies announced in early periods but realized in the future, are inverted by the new rules and increase cumulative emissions. We provide quantitative evidence of our result for a model disciplined on the price rise in the EU ETS that followed the introduction of the MSR.
2019

The question in which we are interested is how a market inhabited by multiple agents, about whom we are differentially uncertain, and who trade goods the use of which imposes a negative effect on others, is to be ideally regulated. We show that a priori asymmetric uncertainty, when combined with a posteriori observed outcomes, is a rich source of information that can be used to reduce aggregate uncertainty. The observation implies that whereas asymmetric information usually entails a cost on welfare, it can help achieve greater efficiency in regulation.
2019

We develop a dynamic regulation game for a stock externality under asymmetric information and future market uncertainty. Within this framework, regulation is characterized as the implementation of a welfare-maximization program conditional on informational constraints. We identify the most general executable such programs and find these yield simple and intuitive policy rules. We apply our theory to carbon dioxide emissions trading schemes and find substantial welfare gains are possible, compared to current practices.
2018

Work in progress

We study why some infectious diseases become pandemics whilst others get eradicated, and suggest a mechanism to prevent the next pandemic in a game of incomplete information. While eradication games of perfect information tend to have multiple equilibria, we show that, for a world consisting of N ≥ 2 countries, even a small amount of uncertainty leads to equilibrium uniqueness. In equilibrium, a pandemic may occur even though eradication would have been efficient, and less harmful diseases may cause more deaths. We then extend the game and, prior to an outbreak, let a subset of countries commit to eradication whenever it is not dominated. The equilibrium is again unique. Selection of the efficient no-pandemic equilibrium is facilitated by this type of international cooperation.
Webversion, 2020

I study the private provision of a public good with strategic complementarities and preference uncertainty. The induced global game has a unique equilibrium. While the equilibrium may be efficient, there are well-identified cases for which it not and the public good is under-provided. I also introduce sequential global games. I show that sequential global games maintain the equilibrium uniqueness of static global games. Moreover, sequentiality expands the range of preferences for which the unique equilibrium is first-best. One application of the theory is climate change. Predictions of the model square well with real-world climate policies. Compared to existing explanations, my theory requires weaker assumptions on incentives and has more predictive power.
2020

Other

Economics Statistische Berichten, 2019

Book chapter, Routledge, 2019

EAERE Magazine, 2018

In Dutch. Report written on request of the Dutch Ministry of Agriculture, Nature and Food Quality regarding the question how – i.e. using which mechanism – the rights to build windmill parks on the North Sea are best allocated.
Government report, 2018

Teaching

  • Grondslagen Macro-economie (Dutch; 2016 - 2019)
  • Macroeconomics for EOR (2017 - 2018)
  • MSc thesis supervision (2017 - 2018)
  • Economics for Social Sciences (2018 - 2019)
  • Micro-economics 2, Game Theory, for CentER (Research Master, 2019 - 2020)

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