We compare the decrease in European energy demand and CO2 emissions during the financial crisis 2008-2009 with the COVID-19 expected drop in demandand emissions, and the price response of the EU Emission Trading System (EUETS). We ask whether the rather limited current price reduction may be due tothe Market Stability Reserve (MSR), implemented in the EU ETS between thetwo crisis. Stylized facts and basic theory are complemented with simulations based on a model of the EU ETS. Together, they suggest a mixed result. The MSR stabilizes the EU ETS price in turbulent times, but less than perfectly. We show that the more persistent the COVID-19 shock is, the less the MSR is able to serve its purpose.
Environmental and Resource Economics, 2020

Nature Climate Change, 2019

Working papers

For any emission trading system (ETS) with quantity-based endogenous supply of allowances, there exists a negative demand shock, e.g. induced by abatement policy, that increases aggregate supply and thus cumulative emissions. We prove this green paradox for a general model and then apply it to the details of EU ETS. In 2018, new rules for a Market Stability Reserve (MSR) were agreed on and implemented. We show that abatement policies announced in early periods but realized in the future, are inverted by the new rules and increase cumulative emissions. We provide quantitative evidence of our result for a model disciplined on the price rise in the EU ETS that followed the introduction of the MSR.

The question in which we are interested is how a market inhabited by multiple agents, about whom we are differentially uncertain, and who trade goods the use of which imposes a negative effect on others, is to be ideally regulated. We show that a priori asymmetric uncertainty, when combined with a posteriori observed outcomes, is a rich source of information that can be used to reduce aggregate uncertainty. The observation implies that whereas asymmetric information usually entails a cost on welfare, it can help achieve greater efficiency in regulation.

We develop a dynamic regulation game for a stock externality under asymmetric information and future market uncertainty. Within this framework, regulation is characterized as the implementation of a welfare-maximization program conditional on informational constraints. We identify the most general executable such programs and find these yield simple and intuitive policy rules. We apply our theory to carbon dioxide emissions trading schemes and find substantial welfare gains are possible, compared to current practices.

Work in progress

We study disease control in a game of imperfect information. While disease control games of perfect information tend to have multiple equilibria, we show that even a small amount of uncertainty leads to equilibrium uniqueness. In equilibrium, an epidemic may occur even though it is inefficient and could have been avoided. Moreover, less harmful diseases may cause more deaths. We extend the game to study cooperation and let a subset of players commit to control the disease whenever the expected benefit of doing so is sufficiently high. The equilibrium is again unique. Selection of a more favorable equilibrium is facilitated by this type of cooperation.
Webversion, 2020



Economics Statistische Berichten, 2019

Book chapter, Routledge, 2019

EAERE Magazine, 2018

In Dutch. Report written on request of the Dutch Ministry of Agriculture, Nature and Food Quality regarding the question how – i.e. using which mechanism – the rights to build windmill parks on the North Sea are best allocated.
Government report, 2018


  • Grondslagen Macro-economie (Dutch; 2016 - 2019)
  • Macroeconomics for EOR (2017 - 2018)
  • MSc thesis supervision (2017 - 2018)
  • Economics for Social Sciences (2018 - 2019)
  • Micro-economics 2, Game Theory, for CentER (Research Master, 2019 - 2020)